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This article discusses whether national courts in EU Member States, when interpreting tax treaty non-discrimination provisions, are
influenced by the CJEU’s case law on the fundamental freedoms. Because these non-discrimination standards are very similar, and
because there is a perception that the non-discrimination standard developed by the CJEU outperforms the tax treaty non-
discrimination standard, those national courts could be tempted to draw inspiration from the CJEU’s case law. However, this article
concludes that, even though some examples are apparent in a number of recent cases, such an influence is currently not widespread in
the reported case law.
In addition, this article considers whether European law requires national courts of EU Member States to draw inspiration from the
case law of the CJEU. In this regard, the article concludes that the principle of legal certainty requires tax treaty non-discrimination
provisions to be interpreted uniformly by all national courts, without any influence from specific legal instruments aimed at regional
market integration.
1 INTRODUCTION
Even though the non-discrimination standards
embodied by Article 24 of the OECD Model Convention
and CJEU case law are quite similar, in both purpose
and content, it seems that there is remarkably little
interaction between them. For the purpose of the
present article, the term ‘interaction’ implies that the
interpretation of one non-discrimination rule is
influenced by the interpretation of the other non-
discrimination rule.1 This article is concerned with the
question whether the interpretation of Article 24 of the
OECD Model Convention has taken a cue from the
enormous evolution of the European standard of non-
discrimination that has occurred in the past three
decades. In particular, it is possible that national courts
interpreting Article 24 of the OECD Model could begin
to incorporate elements developed by the CJEU (e.g.,
the concept of indirect discrimination, justification
grounds, etc.), especially when it concerns a tax treaty
between EU Member States.
This question will be addressed in two steps. First, it
will be determined whether the decisions of national
courts under Article 24 may have been influenced by
CJEU case law. More specifically, it is necessary to
determine whether national courts in EU Member States
have reached different results in applying Article 24 of
the OECD Model Convention than other national courts
because of the influence of CJEU case law (section 2).
Second, there will be a discussion as to whether such an
influence is necessary, i.e., whether Member States are
required to take account of CJEU case law when
interpreting and applying the non-discrimination
provision in their tax treaties with other EU Member
States (section 3).
2 IS THE INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 24 BEING
INFLUENCED BY CJEU CASE LAW?
2.1 General
There is a perception in legal literature that
national courts in EU Member States give a broader
interpretation to Article 24 of the OECD Model
Convention than national courts in non-EU Member
States. Furthermore, it is generally assumed that this
broader interpretation can be explained because national
courts in EU Member States are influenced by CJEU case
law when interpreting Article 24.2
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1 The term ‘interaction’ could also be interpreted as referring to the
notion that a taxpayer may rely on one non-discrimination rule in
order to claim entitlement to benefits granted under another non-
discrimination rule. That is to say, one may wonder whether a
taxpayer can rely on a non-discrimination rule (e.g., a provision
analogous to Article 24 of the OECD Model) in order to claim
entitlement to all benefits guaranteed under another non-
discrimination rule (e.g., the EU fundamental freedoms). That type
of interaction is discussed in detail in N. Bammens, The principle of
non-discrimination in international and European tax law, Amsterdam,
IBFD, 2013, sections 9.2.4.3 and 14.2.9.
2 E.g. L. Hinnekens & P. Hinnekens, General Report, in IFA, Cahiers
de Droit Fiscal International: Non-discrimination at the Crossroads of
International Taxation, vol. 93a at 39 (Sdu Fiscale & Financiële
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If there is indeed such an influence of CJEU case law
on the interpretation of Article 24, one would expect it
to be translated into a higher rate of success for
taxpayers invoking Article 24 before national courts of
EU Member States. There are two reasons for this
assumption. First, in the majority of cases where the
CJEU has applied the fundamental freedoms to national
tax measures of Member States, the decision has been in
favour of the taxpayer. In a sample of 133 decisions
rendered since 1986, the CJEU decided in favour of the
taxpayer 103 times (i.e., 77%).3 Second, in all of the
cases where the influence of CJEU case law on the
interpretation of Article 24 of the OECD Model
Convention was expressly recognized by the national
court (see section 2.2), the non-discrimination issue was
decided in favour of the taxpayer.
The following table (table 1) can be a first indication
as to whether there is such an influence. This table takes
into account a sample of 163 cases decided by national
courts under Article 24.4 A distinction is made between
decisions of national courts of EU Member States and
decisions of national courts of non-EU Member States.
The second and third column indicate the number of
cases that were decided in favour of the taxpayer and the
number of cases that were decided in favour of the tax
authorities.
Table 1 National Court Decisions on Article 24
National Court
Of
Decision In Favour Of
Taxpayer Tax authorities
EU Member
State
49 65
Non-Member
State
13 36
In percentages, national courts in EU Member States
decided 43% of the cases in favour of the taxpayer and
57% of the cases in favour of the tax authorities. In
contrast, national courts in non-EU Member States only
decided 27% of the cases in favour of the taxpayer and
73% of the cases in favour of the tax authorities. This is
a significant difference, which might indicate a more
lenient approach to Article 24 of the OECD Model
Convention by national courts in EU Member States
(supposedly as a result of the influence of CJEU case
law).
Assuming that national courts in EU Member States
are indeed influenced by CJEU case law when
interpreting Article 24, one would expect this influence
to be more pronounced in cases concerning a tax treaty
between two Member States. Indeed, the free movement
of capital in relation to third states is based on the same
conception of non-discrimination as the fundamental
freedoms in relations between Member States, but the
CJEU has accepted that its scope is more limited because
of the inapplicability of certain EU instruments in
relation to third states.5 Consequently, one would expect
there to be less of an influence of CJEU case law where
national courts of Member States have decided issues
involving a treaty with a non-Member State.
In order to verify whether this is indeed the case, the
cases included in table 1 are split up according to
whether the case concerned a tax treaty with a Member
State or with a non-Member State. The result is set out
in table 2:
Table 2 Decisions on Treaties with Member States and
Treaties with Non-Member States
National
Court Of
Treaty With Decision in Favour Of
Taxpayer Tax
authorities
EU Member
State
EU Member
State
20 44
Non-EU
Member State
29 21
Non-EU
Member State
EU Member
State
7 19
Non-EU
Member State
6 17
As could be expected, this division does not make a
difference for national courts of non-Member States. In
cases concerning a treaty with an EU Member State,
27% of the decisions were in favour of the taxpayer,
while 73% were in favour of the tax authorities.
Approximately the same result can be seen for cases
concerning a treaty with a non-Member State: 26%
versus 74%. These values are quite close to the 27%
versus 73% relation in the overall result of the cases
decided by national courts of non-EU Member States
(see above), so it does not make a difference whether a
Uitgevers 2008). See also M. Bennett, David R. Tillinghast Lecture:
Nondiscrimination in International Tax Law: A Concept in Search of a
Principle, 59 Tax L. Rev. 439, 440 (2006) (‘It has become
impossible to ignore the impact of [the CJEU’s] jurisprudence on
the analysis of bilateral tax treaty non-discrimination issues, even
though many in the tax treaty world would like to politely pretend
that the CJEU has no direct relevance to tax treaty provisions and
therefore cannot cause any discomfort’.).
3 It should be noted that this is merely a sample. By no means is it
an exhaustive analysis of the CJEU’s case law on direct taxation. An
overview of the cases included in this sample is on file with the
author.
4 An overview of the cases included in this sample is on file with the
author. Again, it should be emphasized that this list is by no means
exhaustive. Thus, when interpreting these data, it should always be
kept in mind that it depends on which cases happen to have been
published. Nevertheless, the analysis reveals some interesting
insights.
5 E.g. C-446/04, FII, 12 Dec. 2006, paras 170-171; C-101/05, A,
18 Dec. 2007, paras 36-38 and 60.
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national court of a non-Member State decides a case
involving a treaty with a Member State or a treaty with a
non-Member State.
But a division according to the status of the treaty
partner does make a difference for decisions rendered by
national courts of EU Member States. Where those
courts decided a case involving a treaty with another EU
Member State, 31% of the decisions were in favour of
the taxpayer, while 69% of the decisions were in favour
of the tax authorities. This is very close to the 27%
versus 73% relation in the decisions by national courts
in non-Member States (see above), which would suggest
that national courts of EU Member States are not
influenced by CJEU case law when deciding a case
involving a tax treaty with another Member State.
In contrast, where national courts of Member States
decided a case involving a treaty with a non-Member
State, 58% of the decisions were in favour of the
taxpayer, while 42% of the decisions were in favour of
the tax authorities.
This remarkable divergence seems to suggest that the
interpretation of Article 24 by national courts of EU
Member States is more liberal where a treaty with a non-
Member State is concerned. This is counterintuitive
because, as noted above, the limited scope of the free
movement of capital would lead one to expect that the
influence of CJEU case law (which can, hypothetically,
be translated into a higher success rate for the taxpayer)
to be less pronounced in situations involving third
states.
Of course, the data contained in the tables above may
be misleading because they do not reflect the evolution
of case law over time. As a result of the explosive growth
of CJEU case law on direct tax matters since 1990,
Member States have become increasingly aware of the
importance of European law in matters of direct
taxation. Thus, it is possible that the influence of CJEU
case law has become more pronounced in the past
decades. In other words, if it is true that national courts
are influenced by CJEU case law when interpreting
Article 24, it can be expected that that influence has
increased in the past decades, meaning that, gradually,
the percentage of decisions in favour of the taxpayer
under Article 24 of the OECD Model Convention has
increased. Chart 1 sets out the number of decisions by
national courts of EU Member States in favour of the
taxpayer and those in favour of the tax authorities on a
timeline.6 The solid line represents the number of
decisions in favour of the taxpayer, while the dotted line
represents the number of decisions in favour of the tax
authorities.
Chart 1 Evolution of Decisions of National Courts of
EU Member States
This chart does not show a clear evolution. Apart from a
sudden surge in decisions in favour of the tax authorities
in the period 1999–2004, the number of decisions in
favour of the taxpayer remains more or less the same as
the number of decisions in favour of the tax authorities.
Thus, from this overall perspective, it does not seem that
the attitude of national courts of Member States towards
Article 24 has changed over time.
Given the significant difference between decisions
concerning a tax treaty with another Member State and
decisions concerning a tax treaty with a non-Member
State (see above), it may be useful to make this
distinction for the purpose of the chronological
evolution, as well. First, chart 2 includes the decisions of
courts in EU Member States where a treaty with another
Member State was concerned.
Chart 2 Evolution of Decisions of National Courts
of EU Member States on Treaties with Member States
Once again, the chart does not show a clear evolution.
The number of decisions in favour of the taxpayer
remains more or less the same, without any peaks. The
number of decisions in favour of the tax authorities is
also quite constant, apart from a peak in the period
1999–2004. Contrary to what could be expected (see
above), the number of decisions in favour of the
taxpayer does not increase gradually as a result of the
growth of the CJEU’s body of case law. On the contrary,
the number of decisions in favour of the tax authorities
is consistently equal to or exceeds the number of
decisions in favour of the taxpayer since 1989 (apart
from the period 1989–1990 and 1997–1998).
6 The x-axis shows the year in which the decisions were given, while
the y-axis shows the number of decisions. The x-axis is divided
into two-year periods, apart from the period before 1988; because
of the limited number of cases in that period, ten-year periods are
used there.
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Finally, chart 3 includes the decisions of courts in EU
Member States concerning a treaty with a non-Member
State.
Chart 3 Evolution of Decisions of National Courts of
EU Member States on Treaties with Non-Member States
Chart 3 shows that there is no clear evolution over
time in this category of cases either. The only clear trend
that emerges from the chart is that the number of
decisions in favour of the taxpayer consistently exceeds
the number of decisions in favour of the tax authorities
since 1989 (apart from the slight drop in the period
1999–2002 and 2007–2008). Once again, this is a
remarkable finding.
A possible explanation of these charts could be that,
because of the growing awareness of the importance of
EU law in matters of direct taxation, Member States have
begun to amend their domestic legislation so as to
remove incompatibilities with European law. And
because the requirements imposed by the non-
discrimination standard of Article 24 of the OECD
Model Convention are so similar to those imposed by
the fundamental freedoms, the removal of these
incompatibilities with European law automatically
means that the domestic legislation is no longer
incompatible with Article 24 either. In relation to other
Member States, therefore, discriminatory legislation has
been removed to a significant extent. That explains why,
in cases involving a treaty with another Member State,
the number of decisions in favour of the tax authorities
has consistently exceeded the number of decisions in
favour of the taxpayer since 1989 (see chart 2). As the
domestic law is compatible with the fundamental
freedoms, a challenge on the basis of Article 24 will also
fail.
On the other hand, Member States may tend to
restrict themselves to doing what is strictly necessary in
order to ensure compatibility with European law. For
this reason, domestic legislation will often be made non-
discriminatory only in relation to other Member States.
Discrimination therefore still persists in relation to third
states. This may explain why challenges on the basis of
Article 24 have been consistently successful in the past
few decades (see chart 3).
An additional explanation – which is related to the
foregoing – might be that taxpayers are more inclined to
rely on the fundamental freedoms where possible
because of the stronger protection offered as compared
to Article 24 of the OECD Model Convention. Thus, in
situations where the fundamental freedoms may be
applied, i.e., in cases where another Member State is
involved, discriminatory treatment will generally be
challenged on the basis of the fundamental freedoms.
Only where the fundamental freedoms cannot be
applied, i.e., in cases where a third state is involved
(barring the possible application of the free movement of
capital), will taxpayers rely on the tax treaty non-
discrimination provision. Thus, the same discriminatory
treatment will be struck down in both contexts, on the
basis of the fundamental freedoms where possible and,
in other cases, on the basis of Article 24. In other words,
the apparently higher success rate for taxpayers relying
on Article 24 in a situation involving a third state may
be explained by their reluctance to rely on that provision
where other options (i.e., the fundamental freedoms) are
available.
In conclusion, if one assumes that an influence of
CJEU case law on the interpretation of Article 24 of the
OECD Model Convention would result in a more liberal
approach towards that provision by national courts of
EU Member States (meaning that decisions rendered by
national courts of EU Member States are more often in
favour of the taxpayer than decisions rendered by
national courts of third states), then the above analysis
suggests that there is no such influence. The
interpretation given to Article 24 by national courts of
EU Member States and national courts of third states
seems to be identical, except where national courts of
EU Member States decide cases involving a third state.
In the latter situation, taxpayers relying on Article 24 are
more successful, but it is unlikely that this can be
explained by an influence of CJEU case law. Instead, it
seems that the different results in this context can be
explained by the fact that the ongoing integration of the
European internal market has exposed (or even created)
discrimination in relation to third states.
Of course, these charts and tables can be only a
preliminary indication of a possible influence. Indeed,
the outcome of all of the decisions included in the
analysis was to a significant extent determined by the
specific facts at issue. Additionally, because the number
of reported cases on Article 24 (and, therefore, the
number of cases included in this analysis) is still
relatively low, it may not be appropriate to attach much
importance to these results and, in particular, to the
evolution of case law over time as set out in the charts
above. For this reason, it is necessary to find cases where
the national court expressly recognized that there was
some form of influence. On the basis of such cases, more
accurate conclusions may be drawn.
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2.2 Specific Examples
2.2.1 The Comparability of Non-profit Organizations
In a case decided in 2007, the Paris Administrative
Court of Appeal was asked to decide on the tax
treatment in France of pension funds that sold shares in
a French real estate company.7 Notably, the case was
addressed from the perspective of both the tax treaty
non-discrimination clause and the free movement of
capital.
The taxpayer was a Dutch pension fund that sold
shares in French real estate companies. Pursuant to the
applicable French tax legislation, such disposal gave rise
to a capital gains tax in France at a rate of 33.33%. In
contrast, if the taxpayer were a French pension fund, it
would be exempt from the capital gains tax. The
taxpayer therefore argued that the French rules fell foul
of the nationality non-discrimination clause in the
Netherlands-France treaty8 and the free movement of
capital. The French tax authorities relied on the OECD
Commentary and argued that the tax treaty non-
discrimination clause did not require France to extend
benefits granted to non-profit organizations the activities
of which are performed for purposes of public benefit
which are specific to that state, to similar institutions of
the other contracting state.9
The Court first observed that the profits generated
from the Dutch pension fund’s investments were used
exclusively to finance the social benefits guaranteed to
its policyholders and that no profit was distributed. The
Court therefore held that the pension fund had to be
considered as a non-profit organization with a social
purpose.
The Court then held that the difference in treatment
introduced by the French rules was based on the entity’s
corporate seat, i.e., its nationality.10 A French non-profit
organization that administered a pension fund and sold
shares in a French real estate company would be exempt
from the French capital gains tax. As the taxpayer was
comparable to such a French pension fund for purposes
of the transaction in question, the Court held that
the application of the capital gains tax fell foul
of the nationality non-discrimination clause of the
Netherlands-France treaty.11
The tax authorities relied on paragraphs 11 and 13 of
the OECD Commentary on Article 24, to argue that the
non-discrimination provision could not be applied to
non-profit organizations. The Court rejected this
argument by pointing that there was nothing to indicate
that the contracting parties to the Netherlands-France
tax treaty intended to give the non-discrimination
provision the interpretation provided under paragraph
11 of the Commentary on Article 24. Furthermore, the
tax authorities could not rely on paragraph 13 of the
Commentary on Article 24 because that statement was
subsequent to the tax treaty.12
7 Cour Administrative d’Appel de Paris 6 Dec. 2007, 06PA03370,
Fondation Stichting Unilever Pensioenfonds Progress. That Court
applied the exact same line of reasoning and reached the same
conclusion in two similar case decided on the same day (also
concerning the Netherlands-France treaty): Cour Administrative
d’Appel de Paris 6 Dec. 2007, 06PA03371, Fondation Stichting
Providentia and Cour Administrative d’Appel de Paris 6 Dec. 2007,
07PA01717, Fondation Stichting Pensioenfonds Hoogovens. See also
Conseil d’État (5 Jul. 2010), 309693, Pinacothèque d’Athènes, where
a similar issue was decided in favour of the taxpayer under the
nationality non-discrimination clause of the France-Greece treaty
without, however, developing any substantial argumentation.
8 Art. 25(1) Neth.-Fr. Treaty (1973), which is substantially identical
to Art. 24 OECD Model.
9 See paras 11 and 13 OECD Model: Commentary on Article 24 (‘[Art.
24(1) is not] to be construed as obliging a State which accords
special taxation privileges to private institutions not for profit
whose activities are performed for purposes of public benefit
which are specific to that State, to extend the same privileges to
similar institutions whose activities are not for its benefit. [ ... ] If a
State accords taxation privileges to certain private institutions not
for profit, this is clearly justified by the very nature of these
institutions’ activities and by the benefit which that State and its
nationals will derive from those activities’.).
10 This is a remarkable statement. The French measure at issue
distinguished on the basis of the corporate seat (‘siège social’),
which refers to residence. As the case thus concerned
discrimination on the basis of residence rather than discrimination
on the basis of nationality, it did not come within the scope of
application of Art. 24(1). See also L. de Broe & R. Neyt, Tax
Treatment of Cross-border Pensions under the OECD Model and EU
Law, 63 Bull. Intl. Fiscal Docn. (2009), Journals IBFD, at 90. There
is no indication in the judgment that this is an example of a broad
interpretation of Art. 24, due to an influence by CJEU case law. For
further background on the French distinction in this regard, see
N. de Boynes, France, in Residence of Companies under Tax Treaties
and EC Law 441-459 (G. Maisto ed., IBFD Publications 2009).
11 The original text of the decision reads as follows (‘les ressources de
la Fondation [ ... ] sont exclusivement affectées à des investissements
dont les produits financent les diverses prestations sociales qu’elle sert à
ses assurés, à l’exclusion de toute distribution de résultats; que, dans ces
conditions, cette fondation, gérant un régime de retraite et de
prévoyance, doit être regardée comme ayant un objet social à but non
lucratif; [ ... ] la différence de traitement qu’instaurent ces dispositions
est fondée, s’agissant des personnes morales, sur le lieu de leur siège
social qui détermine leur nationalité; [ ... ] une institution française à
but non lucratif gérant un régime de retraite et de prévoyance procédant
à la cession de droits sociaux qu’elle détiendrait dans une société
française ne serait pas assujettie à l’impôt sur les sociétés sur l’éventuelle
plus-value réalisée; que, dès lors, la Fondation Stichting Unilever
Pensioenfonds Progress, dont il ne résulte pas de l’instruction qu’elle ait
été, en ce qui concerne l’opération génératrice du prélèvement litigieux,
dans une situation différente de celle d’institutions françaises réalisant le
même type d’opérations, est fondée à soutenir que [ ... ] l’administration
l’a soumise, en raison de sa nationalité, à une imposition autre ou plus
lourde que celle à laquelle aurait été assujettie une institution française
gérant un régime de retraite et de prévoyance qui aurait réalisé la même
opération imposable’.).
12 The original text of the decision reads as follows: ‘le ministre
soutient que la clause de non-discrimination ne s’applique pas aux
personnes morales à but non lucratif en se référant au paragraphe [11]
des commentaires de l’OCDE sur le modèle de convention fiscale [ ... ];
que, toutefois, il ne ressort pas des pièces du dossier que l’intention des
parties à la convention fiscale franco-néerlandaise aurait été de donner
aux stipulations de l’article 25 de ladite convention la portée résultant
de ces commentaires supplémentaires; qu’enfin le ministre ne saurait, en
tout état de cause, invoquer les dispositions du paragraphe [13] de ces
commentaires, qui sont postérieures auxdites stipulations’. The
statement that para. 13 cannot be relied upon because it is
subsequent to the 1973 Netherlands-France treaty is remarkable
because that paragraph was already included in the 1963
Commentary. Para. 7 OECD Model: Commentary on Article 24
(1963).
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The Court then addressed the compatibility with the
free movement of capital. In this respect, the Court
referred to the CJEU’s decision in Stauffer and noted that
that decision implies that the difference in treatment
introduced by the French rules at issue was
incompatible with the free movement of capital unless it
concerned incomparable situations or it was justified.
With respect to comparability, the Court held that, as it
decided earlier in the context of the tax treaty non-
discrimination clause, the taxpayer was comparable to a
French pension fund. With respect to the justification,
the Court held that the mere fact that French pension
funds ensure activities for the public benefit cannot
constitute a valid justification ground.13
What is interesting is that the Court expressly
conformed the comparability test under the free
movement of capital to that under Article 24(1) of the
OECD Model Convention. Thus, the Court suggested
that, because the situations are comparable under the
tax treaty, they are also comparable under the free
movement of capital. Unfortunately, the Court did not
indicate why the comparability analysis should be the
same. Likewise, it did not expressly state that its analysis
under the tax treaty non-discrimination clause had been
influenced by CJEU case law. But it is interesting to note
that the reason why the situations are held to be
comparable under the tax treaty, is that the foreign
pension fund had to be considered as a non-profit
organization with a social purpose, because the
profits generated from its investments were used
exclusively to finance the social benefits guaranteed to
its policyholders, without any profit being distributed.
Such a foreign pension fund was comparable to a French
non-profit organization that administered a pension
fund.
This line of reasoning is remarkably similar to the
analysis developed by the CJEU in its case law on the
comparability of charities.14 In those cases, the CJEU has
held that a charitable organization established in
Member State A is comparable to a charitable
organization established in Member State B if the former
organization meets the requirements for obtaining
charitable status in Member State B (e.g., exclusively and
directly pursuing charitable objectives) and if the
charitable objective pursued by that organization is
recognized in Member State B as an interest of the
general public which should be encouraged by tax
advantages. Perhaps the implicit influence of CJEU case
law also explains the Court’s remarkable15 statement
that there was nothing to indicate that the contracting
parties to the Netherlands-France tax treaty intended to
give the non-discrimination provision the interpretation
provided for in the OECD Commentary (under which
the non-discrimination clause does not apply to benefits
granted to non-profit organizations the activities of
which are to the public benefit of one contracting state).
But it is difficult to draw any conclusions from the
decision on this point because, as noted above, it does
not specify whether the Court’s analysis under Article 24
was influenced by CJEU case law.
2.2.2 Bundesfinanzhof Decision of 8 September 201016
This is a case were the influence of CJEU case law was
very apparent and where the Court expressly recognized
that influence. The taxpayer, a German resident
company, paid interest to its Swiss resident shareholder.
Because the requirements of the German thin
capitalization rules as they applied at the time were not
fulfilled in the years at issue (1999–2001), the interest
was not deductible. Under those thin capitalization
rules, interest was not deductible if it was paid to a
shareholder who was not entitled to the German
corporation tax credit (in 1999 and 2000) or to a
shareholder who was not taxable in Germany on the
interest received by way of assessment (in 2001).17 It
was clear that the conditions for the applicability of the
thin capitalization rules were fulfilled, but the taxpayer
argued that those rules constituted discrimination
contrary to the ownership non-discrimination clause of
the Germany-Switzerland treaty.18 It should be noted at
the outset that that treaty did not include a deductibility
non-discrimination provision analogous to Article 24(4)
of the OECD Model Convention.
13 The original text of the decision reads as follows: ‘Considérant, au
surplus, qu’il résulte de la jurisprudence de la CJCE, et notamment du
point 32 de la décision [ ... ] Stauffer, que la différence de traitement
instituée par les dispositions de l’article 244bis A du code général des
impôts entre les organismes à but non lucratifs résidents ou non
résidents doit, sauf à méconnaître les dispositions du traité des
communautés européennes relatives à la libre circulation des capitaux,
être justifiée par une raison impérieuse d’intérêt général ou concerner
des situations qui ne sont pas objectivement comparables; que, d’une
part, la Fondation Stichting Unilever Pensioenfonds Progress n’étant
pas, ainsi qu’il a été dit ci-dessus, dans une situation différente des
institutions françaises à but non lucratif gérant un régime de retraite et
de prévoyance, elle est donc, en tout état de cause, placée dans une
situation objectivement comparable à ces dernières; que, d’autre part, si
le ministre relève que lesdites institutions assurent des missions de
service public, cette circonstance ne saurait établir une raison
impérieuse d’intérêt général permettant de déroger au principe de libre
circulation des capitaux institué par l’article 56 du traité des
communautés européennes’ (emphasis added).
14 Particularly C-386/04, Stauffer, 14 Sep. 2006 and C-318/07,
Persche, 27 Jan. 2009. See the discussion in N. Bammens, o.c.,
section 14.2.10.
15 The statement is remarkable because it can be assumed that OECD
members that have not made observations or reservations on the
Commentary agree with the position taken in the Commentary. See
generally D. Ward et al., The Interpretation of Income Tax Treaties
with Particular Reference to the Commentaries on the OECD Model
64–78 (IBFD Publications 2005).
16 Bundesfinanzhof (8 Sep. 2010), I R 6/09, BFHE 231, 75.
17 See also A. Cordewener, Pending Cases Filed By German Courts,
Direct Taxation: Recent CJEU Developments, at 37–61 (M. Lang ed.,
Linde Verlag 2003), (giving a clear overview of the German thin
capitalization rules as they applied when Lankhorst-Hohorst was
pending before the CJEU).
18 Art. 25(3) Ger.-Switz. Treaty (1971), which is identical to Art.
24(5) OECD Model.
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The Bundesfinanzhof decided in favour of the
taxpayer. The Court held that, by applying exclusively to
payments made to shareholders not entitled to the
corporation tax credit or not taxable in Germany by way
of assessment, the German thin capitalization rules were
‘always and in particular’ to the disadvantage of German
companies the capital of which was held or controlled
by non-residents. According to the Court, the fact that
the actual distinguishing criteria used by those rules
(i.e., the non-entitlement to the corporation tax credit or
the absence of taxation by way of assessment) were not
directly based on the shareholder’s residence, was
irrelevant.19 Rather, it was necessary to fully take
account of the parallel European perspective with
respect to the standard of comparison, as it emerged
from the CJEU’s decision in Lankhorst-Hohorst, and this
irrespective of all other differences between the
European and tax treaty non-discrimination rules. In
both cases, it was decisive that both the non-entitlement
to the corporation tax credit and the absence of taxation
by way of assessment primarily concerned non-resident
shareholders.20 The Court therefore decided that the
German rules gave rise to direct discrimination against
Swiss owned enterprises as compared to German owned
enterprises.21
Finally, the Court held that the fact that the German
rules at issue could, in certain cases, also apply to
German owned enterprises, did not affect this
conclusion. According to the purpose and objective of
those rules, they applied primarily and in their actual
effect to foreign owned enterprises. As a result, the
German thin capitalization rules fell foul of the
ownership non-discrimination provision of the
Germany-Switzerland treaty.22
This decision is of particular importance because the
Court expressly stated that the comparison under Article
24(5) should be interpreted identically to that under the
fundamental freedoms. Clearly, the outcome of the case
would have been different without this influence of CJEU
case law. Indeed, Article 24(5) is concerned only with
direct discrimination, i.e., discrimination ‘on the basis of’
foreign ownership.23 Here, the German rules mainly af-
fected foreign owned enterprises, but also some domesti-
cally owned enterprises (e.g., tax-exempt residents).
Obviously, this is a case of indirect discrimination,24 which
goesbeyond the scopeofArticle 24(5) as it has traditionally
been interpreted. Nevertheless, the Court stated that there
is discrimination because this aspect of the tax treaty non-
discrimination clause should be given the same scope as
the non-discrimination standard emerging from the
fundamental freedoms.
Restricting a rule to cover only direct discrimination
means that all relevant characteristics, apart from the
comparative attribute, should be the same.25 Applied to
Article 24(5), this means that all relevant characteristics,
apart from foreign ownership, should be the same. In
the case at hand, the corporate status of the shareholder
was not a relevant characteristic for the purpose of the
German thin capitalization rules under scrutiny. As a
result, a resident company with a non-resident corporate
shareholder could validly be compared to a resident
company with a resident non-corporate shareholder
(e.g., a tax-exempt entity). But because the Court’s
analysis is influenced by CJEU case law, it implicitly
considers that resident companies with a non-resident
corporate shareholder can be validly compared only to
19 Bundesfinanzhof (8 Sep. 2010), I R 6/09, para. 23 (‘Damit werden
stets und insbesondere diejenigen Unternehmen eines Vertragsstaats,
deren Kapital ganz oder teilweise, unmittelbar oder mittelbar einer in
dem anderen Vertragsstaat ansässigen Person oder mehreren solchen
Personen gehört oder ihrer Kontrolle unterliegt, gegenüber
entsprechenden Unternehmen mit im Inland ansässigen Anteilseignern
steuerlich benachteiligt. Dass die tatbestandlichen
Unterscheidungsmerkmale der fehlenden Anrechnungsberechtigung zur
Körperschaftsteuer [ ... ] bzw. der fehlenden Veranlagung [ ... ]
unmittelbar nicht auf die Ansässigkeit der Anteilseigner abstellen, tut
insoweit nichts zur Sache’.).
20 See C-324/00, Lankhorst-Hohorst, paras 27−28 (‘As regards the
taxation of interest paid by subsidiary companies to their parent
companies in return for loan capital, such a restriction introduces a
difference in treatment between resident subsidiary companies
according to whether or not their parent company has its seat in
Germany. In the large majority of cases, resident parent companies
receive a tax credit, whereas, as a general rule, non-resident parent
companies do not. [ ... ] Corporations incorporated under German
law which are exempt from corporation tax and, consequently, not
entitled to tax credit are essentially legal persons governed by
public law and those carrying out business in a specific field or
performing tasks which should be encouraged. The situation of a
company such as the parent company of Lankhorst-Hohorst,
which is carrying on a business for profit and is subject to
corporation tax, cannot validly be compared to that of the latter
category of corporations’.).
21 Bundesfinanzhof (8 Sep. 2010), I R 6/09, para. 23 (‘Vielmehr ist
unbeschadet aller sonstigen Unterschiede zwischen den
unionsrechtlichen Diskriminierungsverboten einerseits und den
abkommensrechtlichen Diskriminierungsverboten andererseits jedenfalls
in diesem Punkt vollumfänglich auf die insoweit – was den
Vergleichsmaßstab anbelangt – parallele gemeinschaftsrechtliche Sicht
zu verweisen[ ... ], wie sie sich aus [ ... ] Lankhorst-Hohorst [ ... ] ergibt.
Ausschlaggebend ist hier wie dort, dass sowohl von der fehlenden
Nichtanrechnungsberechtigung als auch von der fehlenden
Veranlagungsmöglichkeit vorrangig im anderen Vertragsstaat ansässige
Anteilseigner betroffen sind und dadurch im Ergebnis eine
diskriminierende Ungleichbehandlung von Kapitalgesellschaften mit in-
und ausländischen Anteilseignern bewirkt wird. Damit ist die steuerliche
Behandlung von Inlandsgesellschaften mit in der Schweiz ansässigen
Anteilseignern i.S. von Art. 25 Abs. 3 DBA-Schweiz 1971/1992 – und
zwar unmittelbar und nicht lediglich mittelbar – anders oder
belastender als die Besteuerung, denen [ ... ] ‘andere ähnliche
Unternehmen’ in Deutschland unterworfen sind oder unterworfen
werden können’.).
22 Bundesfinanzhof (8 Sep. 2010), I R 6/09, para. 23 (‘Der Umstand,
dass § 8a Abs. 1 Satz 1 Nr. 2 KStG 1999 a.F./n.F. in bestimmten
Situationen gleichermaßen auch für Gesellschaften mit inländischen
Anteilseignern einschlägig werden kann, tritt dahinter zurück;
Zielrichtung der genannten Vorschriften zur steuerlichen Beschränkung
der Gesellschafter-Fremdfinanzierung bei Kapitalgesellschaften ist nach
Regelungssinn und -zweck in erster Linie und in der tatsächlichen
Auswirkung die Erfassung grenzüberschreitender Sachverhalte der
Gesellschafter-Fremdfinanzierung mit ausländischen Anteilseignern’.)
23 See N. Bammens, o.c., section 9.1.3.
24 For some reason, however, the Court nevertheless considers this to
be a case of direct discrimination.
25 See N. Bammens, o.c., chapter 2.
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resident companies with a resident corporate
shareholder (rather than a resident tax-exempt entity).
Arguably, that is what the Court means when it says that
account should be taken of the European non-
discrimination rule with respect to the standard of
comparison (‘was den Vergleichsmaßstab anbelangt’).
Unfortunately, the Court did not address in detail
why such a parallel interpretation was necessary. It only
stated that, irrespective of any other differences with the
European standard (which implies that there are certain
aspects which are not suited for a parallel
interpretation), it is necessary to fully take account of
the European perspective which is parallel to the tax
treaty perspective with respect to the standard of
comparison (‘Vielmehr ist [ ... ] jedenfalls in diesem Punkt
vollumfänglich auf die insoweit – was den Vergleichsmaßstab
anbelangt – parallele gemeinschaftsrechtliche Sicht zu
verweisen’).
2.2.3 Verwaltungsgerichtshof decision of 16 February
200626
The taxpayer, a company resident in the Netherlands,
had a PE in Austria. In 1999, the taxpayer’s PE suffered a
loss. In 2000, the PE earned a profit. The taxpayer
requested the Austrian tax authorities to deduct the loss
suffered in 1999 from the profit made in 2000. Under
Austrian domestic tax law, losses incurred by a non-
resident taxpayer in Austria could be carried forward in
so far as they exceeded the taxpayer’s worldwide income
that was not subject to tax in Austria.27 Consequently,
the loss carry-forward was available only to a non-
resident taxpayer in so far as the Austrian losses could
not be absorbed by the foreign head office. The purpose
of this restriction was to avoid double loss deduction.
The Austrian tax authorities denied the taxpayer’s
request because the PE loss had already been taken into
account in the Netherlands in 1999 for purposes of the
taxation of the head office. According to the tax
authorities, the loss could not be used twice (i.e., both
in the Netherlands and in Austria). The taxpayer argued
that this denial was contrary to the PE non-
discrimination provision of the Austria-Netherlands
treaty28 because an Austrian resident taxpayer would
have been able to carry-over the loss.
The Verwaltungsgerichtshof decided in favour of the
taxpayer. The Court first noted that in 2000, when the
Austrian PE earned a profit, the relief available under
Dutch law for those profits was reduced by the loss of
the foregoing year. As the benefit of the deduction in the
Netherlands in 1999 was thereby neutralized, the losses
could not be used twice.29 As a result, the Court held
that the non-deductibility in Austria constituted
discrimination contrary to the PE non-discrimination
clause. As it would be possible for a resident enterprise
to deduct the loss, the Court concluded that the PE
should be entitled to the same treatment.
Interestingly, the Court then referred to the Marks &
Spencer judgment of the CJEU,30 where it was held that
the possibility that losses could be used twice might
serve as a valid justification ground. In the present case,
however, the Court observed that there was no risk that
the losses would be used twice.31
In other words, the Verwaltungsgerichtshof seems to
consider that the possibility that losses may be
used twice constitutes a possible justification for
discriminatory treatment. Even though the measure at
issue treated comparable situations differently contrary
to Article 24(3), the Court verified whether the
challenged discrimination was justified because the
domestic measure sought to achieve a legitimate
objective, namely the need to prevent the double
deduction of losses.
At first glance, this has the remarkable result that, in
respect of the loss carry-over system at issue here, the
taxpayer’s protection under Article 24(3) seems to
decrease because of the influence from CJEU case law. In
principle, Article 24 does not offer the possibility to
justify discriminatory measures. Thus, it seems that the
influence of CJEU case law on the interpretation of
Article 24 of the OECD Model is that the protection
offered to taxpayers by that provision is scaled back by
giving Member States a way out for discriminatory
measures. More specifically, when there is a possibility
that the losses might be deducted twice, the PE state
may deny the benefit of the carry-over. Even though
there is discrimination, the domestic measure is upheld
because of a reason of general interest.
26 No. 2005/14/0036 and 2007/14/0048. The decision can be found
in Tax Treaty Case Law IBFD.
27 Para. 102 Abs. 2 Z. 2 EStG 1988 (‘Sonderausgaben (§ 18) sind
abzugsfähig, wenn sie sich auf das Inland beziehen. Soweit
Sonderausgaben bereits nach § 70 Abs. 2 und 3 berücksichtigt wurden
und ein Antrag im Sinne des Abs. 1 Z. 3 gestellt wird, sind sie bei der
Veranlagung anzusetzen. Der Verlustabzug (§ 18 Abs. 6 und 7) steht
nur für Verluste zu, die in inländischen Betriebsstätten entstanden sind,
die der Erzielung von Einkünften im Sinn von § 2 Abs. 3 Z. 1bis 3
dienen. Er kann nur insoweit berücksichtigt werden, als er die nicht der
beschränkten Steuerpflicht unterliegenden Einkünfte überstiegen hat’.).
28 Art. 25(3) Austria-Netherlands Treaty (1970), identical to Art.
24(4) OECD Draft Convention (1963).
29 ‘Im Jahr 2000 sei aber in den Niederlanden der in Rede stehende
Verlustausgleich wegen des Gewinnes der österreichischen Betriebsstätte
im Ergebnis wieder rückgängig gemacht worden. Der Gewinn der
österreichischen Betriebsstätten des Jahres 2000 werde nämlich von den
Niederlanden – um eine Doppelverwertung des Verlustes hintanzuhalten
– im Sinne des Befreiungsabkommens lediglich in der Höhe akzeptiert,
soweit diese Einkünfte die 1999 in den Niederlanden in Abzug
gebrachten Verluste übersteigen. Der Verlustausgleich werde damit
‘egalisiert’’.
30 C-446/03, 13 Dec. 2005.
31 ‘Die belangte Behörde zeigt zutreffend auf, dass im Ergebnis nicht eine
mehrfache Verlustverwertung eintreten darf (vgl [ ... ] EuGH vom 13.
Dezember 2005, C-446/03, Marks & Spencer [ ... ]). Eine mehrfache
Verwertung desselben Verlustes stellte eine Wettbewerbsverzerrung dar.
Im gegenständlichen Fall hat allerdings die Beschwerdeführerin im
Verwaltungsverfahren eingewendet, dass eine doppelte
Verlustverwertung ausgeschlossen.’
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2.2.4 The Delaware Case32
The Decision of the Bundesfinanzhof
The taxpayer was the German subsidiary of a company
incorporated in the United States. In the tax year at
issue, the parent company transferred its management to
Germany. In the same year, the taxpayer and the parent
entered into an Organschaft, which meant that the
companies agreed to form a fiscal unity. Under the
German rules applicable at the relevant time, a company
could be regarded as a fiscal unity parent (Organträger)
only if it was not tax-exempt and had its statutory seat
and its place of management in Germany. Additionally, a
non-resident company could be regarded as Organträger
if it had a PE in Germany and was subject to limited tax
liability in Germany.
Because the statutory seat of the parent company in
the present case was not in Germany, the German tax
authorities refused to recognize the fiscal unity
agreement, even though it was liable to unlimited
taxation in Germany due to its place of management
being located there. Moreover, because the parent had
moved its place of management to Germany, it was a
resident for purposes of German domestic tax law and
could therefore not be considered as a non-resident
subject to limited tax liability in Germany. The taxpayer
argued that this refusal fell foul of the ownership non-
discrimination clause of the applicable tax treaty.33
The Bundesfinanzhof decided in favour of the
taxpayer and held that the German rules constituted
discrimination. The Bundesfinanzhof found support for
this conclusion in the CJEU’s decision in Überseering.34
The Bundesfinanzhof acknowledged that that decision
was only directly relevant and binding for Member
States, with the result that legal persons of third states
cannot derive any rights from it. However, the
Bundesfinanzhof stated that:
the case is different with respect to US corporations because
of the bilateral anti-discrimination rule of Art. 24(4) US
DTC 1989. Tax disadvantages of domestic subsidiaries of
US corporations cannot be accepted compared to other
similar domestic companies and as a consequence cannot
be treated disadvantageously compared to companies
within EC Member States.35
The Bundesfinanzhof therefore concluded that the
German tax authorities were required to recognize the
fiscal unity agreement. In an earlier decision, the
Bundesfinanzhof had reached a different conclusion.36
However, that decision was based on the fact that, under
German domestic law, a German company would also be
excluded from Organträger status if it transferred either
its statutory seat or its place of management abroad. A
company incorporated in Germany which transferred its
place of management or statutory seat abroad
‘compulsorily’ causes its own dissolution according to
the seat theory, which prevailed in Germany at the time.
Consequently, that company could no longer be
regarded as an Organträger under German law.
However, this situation could not be compared to
that of a company which transfers its place of
management or its statutory seat from abroad to
Germany. While the first case concerned the transfer of
the place of management or statutory seat of a German
company to a foreign country (i.e., the case of a German
company migrating outward), the latter case concerned
a foreign company migrating inward. With regard to the
former, the German legislature has the jurisdiction to
sanction the outward migration with certain legal
consequences. However, that was not at issue in the case
at hand. The present case concerned a company
migrating to Germany, in which case the German rules
were discriminatory. The Bundesfinanzhof therefore held
that a company that migrates to Germany should not be
compared to a German company that migrates outward,
but to a German company that remains resident in
Germany with its place of management and statutory
seat in Germany.
Finally, the Court repeated that in Überseering, the
CJEU held that the freedom of establishment was
infringed if a company that transferred its place of
management inward was discriminated against. The
Bundesfinanzhof concluded that, in light of that
violation of the EU Treaty, it cannot conclude differently
with regard to the ownership non-discrimination rule of
the Germany-United States treaty. Consequently, the US
company migrating inward should also be able to
operate as an Organträger if it has its statutory seat in the
United States. Thus, Germany ‘is not entitled to apply
special tax rules based on the transfer of the place of
management as it is also not entitled to do so within the
European Community’.37
32 Bundesfinanzhof (29 Jan. 2003), 6 ITLR 318.
33 Art. 24(4) Germany-US Treaty (1989), which is identical to Art.
24(5) OECD Model.
34 CJEU 5 Nov. 2002, C-208/00.
35 Bundesfinanzhof (29 Jan. 2003), 6 ITLR 331 (as translated in
ITLR). The original German text is: ‘Die Entscheidung wirkt sich zwar
unmittelbar nur auf die EG-Mitgliedsstaaten aus. Juristische Personen
anderer (Dritt-) Staaten können im Hinblick darauf keine
Gleichbehandlung mit Angehörigen der Mitgliedsstaaten einfordern.
Wegen des in Art. 24 Abs 4 DBA-USA 1989 enthaltenen bilateralen
Diskriminierungsverbots verhält es sich für eine US-Kapitalgesellschaft
jedoch anders. Besteuerungsnachteile inländischer Tochterunternehmen
von US-amerikanischen Unternehmen gegenüber anderen ähnlichen
inländischen Unternehmen sind hiernach nicht hinzunehmen und
können deswegen im Ergebnis keiner für sie ungünstigeren Beurteilung
als Unternehmen innerhalb der EG unterfallen’.
36 Bundesfinanzhof (13 Nov. 1991), BStBl II 1992, 263.
37 Bundesfinanzhof (29 Jan. 2003), 6 ITLR 335 (as translated in
ITLR). The original text of the decision reads as follows: ‘Vor dem
Hintergrund dieser Verletzung des EGV kann im Hinblick auf das in
Art. 24 Abs 4 DBA-USA 1989 enthaltene Diskriminierungsverbot nicht
anders entschieden werden. Die Klägerin darf als inländische
Beteiligungsgesellschaft eines US-amerikanischen Unternehmens keiner
anderen oder belastenderen Besteuerung unterworfen werden als andere
ähnliche inländische Unternehmen, auch nicht in Bezug auf dessen
Ansässigkeit. [ ... ] Für die Anerkennung des körperschaftsteuerrechtlichen
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Commentary
Before Überseering, German courts traditionally held that
a company that moved its place of management to
Germany was unable to be a party to legal proceedings
unless it were reincorporated in Germany.38 As regards
companies moving their seat from another EU Member
State to Germany, that position had to be changed after
Überseering.
In the Delaware case, the Bundesfinanzhof concluded
that, because of the CJEU’s decision in Überseering,
Article 24(5) of the OECD Model Convention requires
the German Organschaft to be extended to resident
companies owned by residents of the other contracting
state. This could mean one of two things: either the
Bundesfinanzhof interpreted Article 24(5) of the OECD
Model analogously to the fundamental freedoms (which
would mean that the protection offered under the tax
treaty non-discrimination clause is the same as the
protection offered under the freedoms), or the
Bundesfinanzhof considered that the ‘national treatment’
which serves as the benchmark under Article 24(5)
includes advantages granted under the EU Treaty
(including advantages resulting from CJEU decisions).
At first glance, it seems that the Bundesfinanzhof takes
the latter approach, as it states that Article 24(5) means
that ‘tax disadvantages of domestic subsidiaries of US
corporations cannot be accepted compared to other similar
domestic companies and as a consequence cannot be treated
disadvantageously compared to companies within EC
Member States’ (emphasis added).39
However, that line of reasoning is not entirely
convincing. Indeed, tax advantages granted as a result of
specific regional instruments seeking to achieve legal
integration (e.g., the EU Treaty) go beyond the ‘national
treatment’ to which the subject of comparison’s
treatment is compared under Article 24.40 Such tax
advantages are granted with the specific purpose of
achieving market integration between the Member States
of the regional instrument in question. The entitlement
to those benefits is inherently linked with the status as a
resident of a state that is a party to that regional
instrument. As a result, those benefits cannot be
extended on the basis of a non-discrimination clause in
a tax treaty.41
On the other hand, it is also possible that the
Bundesfinanzhof interpreted the tax treaty non-
discrimination clause in line with the CJEU’s
interpretation of the fundamental freedoms. In other
words, the Bundesfinanzhof considered that, because the
CJEU would strike down the distinction made by the
German rules in an EU context, the same should be true
under Article 24(5) in a non-EU context.42 As in the
Organschafts-verhältnisses bedeutet dies, dass die zuziehende
amerikanische Gesellschaft auch dann als Organträger [ ... ] fungieren
kann, wenn sie über einen statutarischen Sitz in den USA verfügt. Der
andere Vertragsteil – hier die Bundesrepublik – ist ebenso wie innerhalb
der EG und des Geltungsbereichs des EGV nicht befugt, an den Wechsel
des tatsächlichen Verwaltungssitzes besondere Besteuerungsfolgen zu
knüpfen’.
38 Under German procedural law, an action brought by a party which
did not have the capacity to bring legal proceedings was dismissed
as inadmissible. Any person, including a company, having legal
capacity had the capacity to be a party to legal proceedings (legal
capacity being defined as the capacity to enjoy rights and to be the
subject of obligations). It was settled case law in Germany that a
company’s legal capacity was determined by reference to the law
applicable in the place where its place of effective management was
established (real seat principle), as opposed to the incorporation
principle, by virtue of which legal capacity is determined in
accordance with the law of the state in which the company was
incorporated. That rule also applied where a company had been
validly incorporated in another state and subsequently transferred
its place of effective management to Germany. As a company’s legal
capacity was determined by reference to German law, it could not
enjoy rights or be the subject of obligations or be a party to legal
proceedings unless it were reincorporated in Germany in such a
way as to acquire legal capacity under German law. In Überseering,
the CJEU held that this requirement fell foul of the fundamental
freedoms.
39 Bundesfinanzhof (29 Jan. 2003), 6 ITLR 331 (as translated in ITLR)
(emphasis added). The original German text is: ‘Besteuerungsnachteile
inländischer Tochterunter-nehmen von US-amerikanischen Unternehmen
gegenüber anderen ähnlichen inländischen Unternehmen sind hiernach
nicht hinzunehmen und können deswegen im Ergebnis keiner für sie
ungünstigeren Beurteilung als Unternehmen innerhalb der EG
unterfallen’. Bundesfinanzhof (29 Jan. 2003), 6 ITLR 322 (emphasis
added).
40 That is to say, those benefits do not form part of the treatment to
which the object of comparison is entitled when it is ascertained
under Art. 24 of the OECD Model whether that object of
comparison is treated less burdensome/more favourably/differently
than the subject of comparison.
41 See N. Bammens, o.c., section 9.2.4.3.
42 E.g. G. Toifl, Gemeinschaftsrechtkonforme Interpretation der DBA-
rechtlichen Diskriminierungsverbote, Steuer&Wirtschaft International
(2004), at 325 (‘Diese bezugnahme auf die Rechtsprechung des EuGH zu
den gemeinschaftlichen Grundfreiheiten indiziert, dass der BFH an seiner
bisherigen Rechtsprechung eines unterschiedlichen Inhalts der
gemeinschafts- und abkommensrechtlichenDiskriminierungsverbote nicht
mehr festhalten will’.). Similarly, D. Gosch, Vielerlei Gleichheiten: Das
Steuerrecht im Spannungsfeld von bilateralen, supranationalen und
verfassungsrechtlichen Anforderungen, Deutsches Steuerrecht (2007),
at 1560 (‘EG- und DBA-Diskriminierungsverbote stehen als
unterschiedliche Rechtskreise nebeneinander. Beide Rechtskreise enthalten
auch unterschiedliche Anforderungen an die Schutzintensität. [ ... ] Den-
noch: Es kann zu tatbestandlichen Überschneidungen kommen, die eine
Drittstaatenwirkung erzwingen. [ ... ] Auch dann, wenn der EG-rechtliche
Schutz über denjenigen des Abkommens hinausgeht, spricht viel dafür, die
EG-Gleichbehandlungsgebote in die Abkommens-Diskriminierungsverbote
einfließen zu lassen. Die Abkommens-Diskriminierungsverbote wären
dafür zu ‘materialisieren’: Nicht nur die darin vorgegebenen Dif-
ferenzierungskriterien würden sich diskriminierend auswirken, auch
versteckte Diskriminierungenwie imGemeinschaftsrecht. Auf der anderen
Seite wäre der Absolutheitsanspruch der abkommensrechtlichen
Diskriminierungsverbote zu relativieren und an den Rechtfertigungs-
gründen des EuGH zu messen. Der I. Senat des BFH hat einen ersten
Schritt in diese Richtung einer wechselseitigen Verschränkung der Dis-
kriminierungsverbote jedenfalls schon getan. Er hat in seinem sog.
Delaware-Urteil vom 29.1.2003, I R 6/99, zur Zulässigkeit grenzüber-
schreitenderOrganschaftsverhältnisse gemeinschaftsrechtlicheGleichheit-
sanforderungenmit Art. 24DBA-USA verknüpft und dies erklärtermaßen
auf die Überseering-Entscheidung des EuGH gestützt’.) On the other
hand, the circular that was issued by the German Ministry of Finance
in order to clarify the effect of the decision discussed here
(Bundesministerium der Finanzen, ‘Diskriminierungsverbote der
Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen; BFH-Urteil vom 29. Januar 2003’,
BstBl I 2004, 1181) points out that the Bundesfinanzhof’s decision does
not imply that the tax treaty non-discrimination clause and the pro-
hibition of discrimination under the fundamental freedoms offer the
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cases discussed above, however, the Bundesfinanzhof
does not give any reason why the tax treaty non-
discrimination provision should be interpreted in line
with the fundamental freedoms.
2.2.5 Conclusion
All of the cases discussed here were decided in the past
decade. Even though the number of cases where the
influence of CJEU case law on the interpretation of the
tax treaty non-discrimination provisions is still quite
modest, this may indicate that courts in EU Member
States are gradually growing aware of the necessity of an
analogous interpretation of both standards.
Unfortunately, none of the cases discussed here offers
any guidance as to why these courts consider such an
influence to be necessary. The following section
considers whether there are legal arguments that justify
such an influence.
3 SHOULD THE INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 24 BE
INFLUENCED BY CJEU CASE LAW?
The case law discussed above shows that CJEU case law
does have some influence on the interpretation given to
Article 24 of the OECD Model Convention by national
courts of EU Member States, particularly in the last
decade. This raises the question as to whether such an
influence is appropriate. On this point, opinions are
somewhat divided. For example the European
Commission has published a working paper on the
interaction between EU law and tax treaties43 which also
addressed the question as to whether the non-
discrimination provision in tax treaties should be
interpreted in accordance with the case law developed
by the CJEU. In particular, it pointed out that Article 24
of the OECD Model ‘should reflect the fundamental
non-discrimination principles of the Treaty’. According
to the working paper, this may imply:
equating nationality with residence, treating permanent
establishments in the same way as resident subsidiaries,
and requiring provisions available to groups of companies
within a Member State to be applicable where one of the
members of the group is resident in another EU Member-
State.44
Additionally:
[a]ny statement that anti-abuse legislation is not prohibited
under this Article would have to reflect the restrictions on
anti-abuse legislation to be inferred from the EC Treaty. Any
other special rules added by Member States in Article 23
and 24 to govern the taxation of income which has been
taxed at a low-rate in another country would have to
aligned with the Treaty.45
The OECD Discussion Draft on Article 24 also addresses
this issue.46 Under the heading ‘Issues that require a
more fundamental analysis’, the following four
observations are made. First, courts, primarily in EU
Member States, might be tempted to extend to the
interpretation of Article 24 some of the principles
developed by the CJEU. Second, it could be argued that
Article 24 can result in an indirect application of
provisions of the EU Treaty to residents of non-EU
Member States. As a result, EU Member States that have
introduced specific rules for nationals of EU Member
States might be forced to extend these rules to nationals
of states with which they have a tax treaty including a
nationality non-discrimination provision. Third, the
Discussion Draft notes that it might be useful to
consider some of the concepts and arguments developed
under European law, e.g., the concept of justification,
when discussing the desirability of alternative or
additional non-discrimination rules for tax treaties.
Finally, there might be more technical issues where the
impact of European law on the interpretation of Article
24 is unclear and should be examined.
Thus, the working paper published by the European
Commission takes the position that Article 24 of the
OECD Model Convention should be interpreted in
accordance with CJEU case law under the fundamental
freedoms. The OECD Discussion Draft is less conclusive
and merely points out that, in practice, there may be an
influence but that there should be further research to
determine whether such influence is desirable.
First, it should be emphasized that the question to be
addressed here is not whether one standard should yield
to the other if there is a conflict between them. If a
national measure is found not to infringe a tax treaty
non-discrimination provision, that does not mean that it
can no longer be considered incompatible with the
fundamental freedoms. Vice versa, if a national measure
is held to be compatible with the fundamental freedoms,
it is still possible that it infringes the tax treaty non-
discrimination provision. As both standards simply set
forth what is prohibited, the conclusion that a national
same protection. The tax treaty contains an exhaustive list and
description of possible cases of discrimination, whereas the reason
for the difference in treatment does not matter under the freedoms
(‘Aus dem Urteil können keine, über den entschiedenen Sachverhalt
hinausgehende Folgerungen für die Anwendung der DBA-
Diskriminierungsverbote hergeleitet werden. Insbesondere sind die Dis-
kriminierungsverbote der DBA und des EGV nicht deckungsgleich. Die
DBA enthalten eine abschließende Aufzählung und Umschreibung mögli-
cherDiskriminierungstatbestände, während es für denDiskriminierungss-
chutz nach dem EGV auf den Grund der Ungleichbehandlung nicht
ankommt’.).
43 Commission Staff Working Paper, SEC(2001) 1681, ‘Company
Taxation in the Internal Market’, at 385.
44 Ibid., at 361.
45 Ibid.
46 OECD, ‘Application and Interpretation of Article 24 (Non-
discrimination): Public Discussion Draft’ (3 May 2007), at 29.
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measure is not prohibited by one standard does not
affect the analysis under the other standard. Thus, there
is no actual conflict in the application of both standards.
What is at issue here is whether the interpretation of
the tax treaty non-discrimination provision should be
affected by the interpretation given to the fundamental
freedoms by the CJEU. More specifically, are there legal
arguments that require national courts of EU Member
States to take account of CJEU case law on the
fundamental freedoms when interpreting a tax treaty
non-discrimination clause? According to Vogel, that is
not the case:
Several reasons militate against applying the ECJ case law
regarding Art. 6 of the EC Treaty to the interpretation of
Art. 24 MC [ ... ]. In particular, the different functions of
the two provisions must be considered. Whereas non-
discrimination plays a central part in helping the EC
advance towards its economic goal [ ... ] of reaching a
European Single Market, Art. 24 MC is one of the special
rules of the MC which is not necessary to achieve the
primary treaty-goal of avoiding double taxation and
preventing tax evasion. This leads to a more narrow
interpretation of the rule. Further, the MC lists in detail the
cases in which it forbids discrimination based on residence,
whereas under the EC Treaty the entire protection from
discrimination must be derived from the criterion
‘nationality’. [ ... ] Finally, the higher importance of Anglo-
American legal principles for the interpretation of Art. 24
MC must be considered, particularly for the case of
discrimination against juridical persons.47
These three reasons do not seem to be entirely
convincing. First, the objective of Article 24 and the
fundamental freedoms is quite comparable, as both rules
seek to promote economic integration by removing
discriminatory tax obstacles.48 Second, it is true that the
scope of Article 24 is much narrower, in that it expressly
lists the situations in which it may be applied, but that
does not mean that the principle underlying it is
different from the principle underlying the fundamental
freedoms. Thus, that different scope does not imply that
the interpretation of the former should not be influenced
by that of the latter. Finally, it is not clear to the author
why or how Article 24 is characterized by a ‘higher
importance of Anglo-American legal principles’. And
even if it were, why should that prevent national courts
of EU Member States from being influenced by CJEU
case law?
That being said, it is more important to find
arguments in favour of an interpretation of Article 24 in
accordance with CJEU case law than to find arguments
against such an interpretation. As noted above, a parallel
application of both provisions does not give rise to any
apparent conflict, so there is no reason why both
provisions cannot coexist side by side without
influencing each other. It would be appropriate to allow
the interpretation of Article 24 to be influenced by CJEU
case law only if European tax law were to require there to
be such an influence.49 If not, there are no reasons why
the interpretation given to Article 24 by national courts
of EU Member States should deviate from that given by
other national courts. Indeed, it would be preferable for
national courts to give a uniform interpretation to tax
treaty provisions on the basis of the Commentary,
thereby ensuring consistent case law and (thus) legal
certainty for the taxpayer.
In other words, the issue is not whether Article 24 is
incompatible with the fundamental freedoms, but what
happens when Article 24 allows (but does not require) a
Member State to adopt a national measure which is
incompatible with the fundamental freedoms. That is to
say, as the fundamental freedoms offer broader
protection against discrimination, it is likely that a
national measure would not infringe Article 24 while at
the same time infringing the freedoms. The issue to be
addressed here is whether European law requires Article
24 to be interpreted in such a way as to prohibit such a
national measure. In order to illustrate this, reference
can be made to the Evans Medical case,50 which
concerned the prohibition to import diamorphine (an
opium derivative) into the United Kingdom. The
applicant, a UK pharmaceutical company, argued that
this prohibition infringed the free movement of goods.
The CJEU acknowledged that the prohibition imposed
by the United Kingdom restricted the free movement of
goods. However, the 1961 Treaty on Narcotic Drugs, to
which the United Kingdom was a party, allowed
contracting states to prohibit importation of narcotic
drugs into their territory, but did not require them to
adopt such measures. On this point, the CJEU held:
‘when an international agreement allows, but does not
require, a Member State to adopt a measure which
appears to be contrary to Community law, the Member
State must refrain from adopting such a measure’.51 As a
result, the prohibition infringed the free movement of
goods, even though it was allowed by the 1961 Treaty.
This is precisely the issue under analysis here, namely
that an international agreement allowed (but did not
require) the United Kingdom to adopt a national
measure, but that national measure was incompatible
with the fundamental freedoms. It is important to note
that the CJEU did not state that the provisions of the
47 K. Vogel, Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation Conventions (Kluwer Law
International 1997) o.c., at 1283 (emphasis in original text).
48 See N. Bammens, o.c., chapter 19.
49 An alternative approach would be to argue that international law
requires the interpretation of Article 24 to be influenced by CJEU
case law. In particular, the question arises whether the ‘context’ in
which a tax treaty should be interpreted (cf. Article 3(2) of the
OECD Model), includes regional market integration instruments
such as the EU freedoms and the accompanying CJEU case law.
However, this question goes beyond the scope of the present
article.
50 C-324/93, Evans Medical Ltd, 28 Mar. 1995.
51 Ibid., at para. 32. Similarly, C-124/95, 14 Jan. 1997, Centro-Com
Srl, para. 60.
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1961 Treaty should be interpreted in accordance with
the free movement of goods. The Court only states that
the free movement of goods precludes a measure which
prohibits the importation of certain goods, even if such a
prohibition were allowed by a treaty to which the
contracting state in question is a party. Thus, this is not a
matter of interpreting an international tax treaty in
accordance with European law, but of striking down a
national measure that infringes the free movement
provisions (even though it is allowed by the treaty).
Thus, the core issue is whether there are principles of
European law which require Article 24 to be interpreted
in accordance with CJEU case law. Could it be said, first
of all, that this is required by the principle of loyal
cooperation, as provided under Article 4(3) of the TEU
(Former Article 10 of the EC Treaty)? Loyal cooperation
implies two obligations for the Member States, namely
(1) to take all appropriate measures to ensure fulfilment
of the obligations arising out of the Treaties or resulting
from the acts of the institutions of the Union (positive
loyalty) and (2) to refrain from any measure which
could jeopardize the attainment of the Union’s objectives
(negative loyalty). The latter, negative, obligation is of
little use in the present discussion. Indeed, if a national
court were to find that a domestic measure does not
infringe a tax treaty non-discrimination clause, then that
conclusion does not say anything about the measure’s
compatibility with the fundamental freedoms. The same
national court is still free to declare the domestic
measure incompatible with the fundamental freedoms.
Thus, it cannot be said that that court acts in a disloyal
manner and jeopardizes the attainment of the Union’s
objectives. Interpreting the tax treaty non-discrimination
clause in a restrictive manner does not have any impact
on the effectiveness of EU law in this respect. As long as
the national court interprets the fundamental freedoms
correctly (i.e., in line with CJEU case law), it gives
proper effect to EU law.
The conclusion may be different with respect to the
positive aspect of loyalty. The CJEU has held that this
positive aspect requires all national authorities,
including national courts, to interpret national law in
light of the wording and purpose of EU law.52 It also
precludes national courts from adopting judgments that
conflict with judgments of the CJEU.53 Perhaps, it could
be argued that this obligation also extends to the
interpretation of tax treaties. As a result, it could be said
that a loyal interpretation of the fundamental freedoms
requires national courts of EU Member States to
interpret Article 24 of the OECD Model Convention in
accordance with CJEU case law. However, such an
interpretation probably goes beyond what EU loyalty
seeks to ensure. It is true that national law must be
interpreted in a way that is consistent with EU law. As a
result, domestic measures that are inconsistent with the
fundamental freedoms should be struck down by
national courts, and national courts should thereby
follow the CJEU’s judgments. But this does not mean
that national courts are under an obligation to interpret
every international treaty that allows such a domestic
measure in accordance with CJEU case law. It is national
law, not the treaty, which creates the incompatibility
with EU law. Thus, the principle of loyalty requires the
national measure to be struck down, but it does not say
anything about treaties that allow such a measure.
The principle of EU loyalty is also the basis for a
second principle to be addressed here, namely the
principle of effectiveness of EU law (effet utile).54 Could
it be said that this principle of effectiveness requires an
interpretation of Article 24 in accordance with CJEU
case law? An important aspect of this principle is that
EU law must have primacy over any level of national or
bilateral law of the Member States.55 But, once again,
this is of little relevance when there is no conflict
between the two sources of law. As noted above,
declaring a national measure to be compatible with the
non-discrimination provision in a tax treaty does not say
anything about that measure’s compatibility with the
fundamental freedoms.
However, another aspect of the principle of
effectiveness is that national law must be interpreted in
conformity with EU law (the consistent interpretation
principle).56 Accordingly, when interpreting national
law, national courts must do so in light of the wording
and the purpose of EU law in order to achieve the result
pursued by the latter. In other words, where two
interpretations are possible, one of which is in
conformity with EU law while the other is not, the
consistent interpretation principle requires the former
interpretation to be applied. Applied to Article 24 of the
OECD Model Convention, it could be said that national
courts are under an obligation to interpret that provision
in a manner which ensures that the objective pursued by
the fundamental freedoms is attained. And in order to
do so, account should be taken of CJEU case law on the
interpretation of those freedoms. As this is quite similar
to the argument made above, with respect to the positive
aspect of the principle of EU loyalty, it should be
rejected for the same reason. It is true that the consistent
interpretation principle requires that domestic measures
which are incompatible with the fundamental freedoms
be struck down, but this does not mean that the
52 E.g. Case 14/83, Sabine von Colson and Elisabeth Kamann, 10 Apr.
1984, para. 26; C-106/89, Marleasing, 13 Nov. 1990, para. 8. See
also Case 106/77, Simmenthal, 9 Mar. 1978, para. 17.
53 See J. Lang, Article 10 EC: The Most Important ‘General Principle’ of
Community Law, in General Principles of EC Law in a Process of
Development 91 (U. Bernitz, J. Nergelius & C. Cardner eds., Kluwer
L. Intl. 2008).
54 See J. Lang, ‘Article 10 EC: The Most Important ‘General Principle’
of Community Law’ (Kluwer Law International 2008), o.c., at 76.
55 For example, Case 6/64, Costa v. E.N.E.L., 15 Jul. 1964.
56 E.g. C-91/92, Faccini Dori, 14 Jul. 1994, para. 26; C-160/01, Mau,
15 May 2003, paras 34-36.
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interpretation of a treaty allowing such a domestic
measure should be affected.
A third possible argument is that resolving an issue
under Article 24 by interpreting that provision in
accordance with CJEU case law, squares better with the
subsidiarity principle than resolving the issue under the
free movement provisions.57 According to Article 5 of
the TEU (former Article 5 of the EC Treaty), the
principle of subsidiarity means that, in areas which do
not fall within its exclusive competence, the Union may
act only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed
action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member
States but can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of
the proposed action, be better achieved at the Union
level. As direct taxation is an area which does not fall
within the exclusive competence of the Union, the
objective of realizing an internal market – which
underlies the fundamental freedoms – should be
achieved at the level of the Member States where
possible. Could it be said that this principle requires
national courts of Member States to interpret Article 24
in line with CJEU case law, on the basis that the
objectives of the fundamental freedoms should be
achieved by national or bilateral instruments where
possible, and only by EU instruments where necessary?
The author does not think that this is an appropriate
interpretation of the subsidiarity principle. This
principle governs the relationship between the
institutions of the Union and the Member States, that is
to say, it limits the extent to which those institutions
may exercise their competence.58 More specifically, it
states that the institutions of the Union act only where
the objective in question can be better achieved at the
Union level. But it does not say anything about the
relationship between two different legal sources (i.e., a
tax treaty and the fundamental freedoms) when a matter
is brought before a national court of a Member State.
After having decided that a national measure is
compatible with Article 24, there is nothing to preclude
the national court from declaring that measure
incompatible with the fundamental freedoms. This has
nothing to do with subsidiarity; there is no doubt in
such a situation as to whether the matter should be
addressed at the Union level or at the Member State
level.
Thus, the main problem in applying these general
principles to the issue at hand is that there is no
incompatibility between the tax treaty and the
fundamental freedoms.59 The principles described above
mostly concern the situation where there is a conflict
between national or bilateral law on the one hand, and
EU law on the other. But this is not the case where
Article 24 is concerned. The problem is not that the
non-discrimination provision of a tax treaty is
incompatible with EU law, but that a national measure is
not incompatible with Article 24 while it is possibly
incompatible with the fundamental freedoms. Clearly,
this is not a matter of conflicting rules, so the principles
described here are not very helpful.
To summarize, it does not seem that European law
requires the non-discrimination provision in tax treaties
to be interpreted in accordance with CJEU case law on
the fundamental freedoms. It could be said that such a
parallel interpretation is required by the ‘consistent
interpretation’ aspect of the principle of effectiveness
(and, related thereto, the positive aspect of the loyalty
principle), but so far this seems rather theoretical.
Ultimately, there is no conflict between the two
standards, so there is no real reason why there should be
any influence. If a matter is governed by both a tax
treaty non-discrimination provision and the
fundamental freedoms, it is not problematic to interpret
both standards separately in their appropriate legal
framework. If a matter is governed by only one
standard, there is nothing to require that the other
standard also be taken into account in the interpretation
process. Additionally, as noted above, it would be
preferable from the perspective of legal certainty that
nationals courts worldwide interpret Article 24
uniformly, without being influenced by regional
particularities.
4 CONCLUSION
Given the similarity of both standards, and the
perception that the European standard outperforms the
international standard, there is a possibility that national
courts could draw inspiration from CJEU case law when
they apply Article 24, which could lead to increased
protection for taxpayers challenging discriminatory tax
measures. However, the reported case law does not
reveal widespread influence. Article 24 seems to be
interpreted identically by national courts of EU Member
States and national courts of non-Member States. The
only deviation is that national courts of EU Member
States decide more often in favour of the taxpayer where
a tax treaty with a non-Member State is concerned.
57 M. Lehner, Der Einfluss des Europarechts auf die
Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen, Internationales Steuerrecht (2001),
at 337.
58 K. Lenaerts and P. van Nuffel, Constitutional Law of the European
Union 101 (Sweet & Maxwell 2005).
59 For this reason, it is not necessary to distinguish between tax
treaties concluded before and after the Member State in question
acceded to the EU. According to Art. 351 of the TFEU (former Art.
307 of the EC Treaty), ‘the rights and obligations arising from
agreements concluded before 1 Jan. 1958 or, for acceding States,
before the date of their accession, between one or more Member
States on the one hand, and one or more third countries on the
other, shall not be affected by the provisions of the Treaties. To the
extent that such agreements are not compatible with the Treaties,
the Member State or States concerned shall take all appropriate
steps to eliminate the incompatibilities established’. As there is no
incompatibility between the obligations imposed by the tax treaty
and those imposed by the fundamental freedoms, this distinction is
irrelevant.
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However, it is unlikely that that deviation reveals a
desire to offer broader protection to taxpayers in that
context. Rather, it seems that EU Member States have
removed tax discrimination to a significant extent, but
only in relation to other Member States. Additionally, it
seems likely that taxpayers are inclined to rely on the
fundamental freedoms where possible (i.e., where two
Member States are involved) and only on Article 24
where that is impossible (i.e., where a non-Member
State is involved, barring the possible application of the
free movement of capital).
Nevertheless, the past decade has seen a number of
cases in which this influence was expressly articulated,
so it is possible that the influence will gradually increase
in the future. Unfortunately, the national courts that
draw inspiration from CJEU case law do not indicate
why such an influence is necessary or appropriate. In
this context, it was submitted that European law does
not require Article 24 to be interpreted in accordance
with CJEU case law. As a result, the principle of legal
certainty requires Article 24 to be interpreted uniformly
by all national courts, without any influence from
specific legal instruments aimed at regional market
integration.
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